In *United States ex rel. Taylor v. Taft*, 24 App. D.C. 95, 98 (1904), this court pointed out:

> "The question of fitness, capacity, attention to the duties of an officer, is necessarily to be determined by the heads of the departments; this determination is only arrived at by the exercise of discretion and judgment . . . ."

These cases and others of similar import, decided both before and after the passage of the Administration Procedure Act in 1946, make it clear that employee removal and discipline are almost entirely matters of executive agency discretion, and that judicial review of such actions is ordinarily available only to determine if there has been substantial compliance with the pertinent statutory procedures provided by Congress and no misconstruction of governing legislation. This has resulted in an unbroken line of authorities holding that, so long as there was substantial compliance with applicable procedures and statutes, the administrative determination was not reviewable as to the wisdom or good judgment of the department head in exercising his discretion. See, *inter alia*, *Keyton v. Anderson*, 97 U.S. App. D.C. 178, 229 F. 2d 519 (1956); *Williams v. Cravens*, 93 U.S. App. D.C. 380, 210 F. 2d 874 (1954), *cert. denied*, 348 U.S. 819; *Kohlberg v. Gray*, 93 U.S. App. D.C. 97, 207 F. 2d 35 (1953), *cert. denied*, 346 U.S. 937; *Blackmon v. Lee*, 92 U.S. App. D.C. 268, 205 F. 2d 13 (1953); *Powell v. Brannan*, 91 U.S. App. D.C. 16, 196 F. 2d 87 (1952); *Carter v. Forrestal*, 85 U.S. App. D.C. 53, 175 F. 2d 364 (1949), *cert. denied*, 338 U.S. 832.

Limited as to scope of review by the decisions cited above, we have examined all the points and arguments urged by appellant. Here there was clearly an adequate basis for the exercise of discretion, and that discretion was exercised. We find no error or failure to comply with applicable statutory procedures, or other error cognizable within the scope of permissible review.

Affirmed.